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ABSTRACT
Influence maximization, the fundamental of viral marketing, aims
to find top-K seed nodes maximizing influence spread under certain
spreading models. In this paper, we study influence maximization
from a game perspective. We propose a Coordination Game model,
in which every individuals make their decisions based on the benefit
of coordination with their network neighbors, to study informa-
tion propagation. Our model serves as the generalization of some
existing models, such as Majority Vote model and Linear Thresh-
old model. Under the generalized model, we study the hardness of
influence maximization and the approximation guarantee of the
greedy algorithm. We also combine several strategies to accelerate
the algorithm. Experimental results show that after the acceleration,
our algorithm significantly outperforms other heuristics, and it is
three orders of magnitude faster than the original greedy method.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Data mining; • Theory of compu-
tation→ Design and analysis of algorithms;
KEYWORDS
influence maximization; coordination game model; social networks;
viral marketing
1 INTRODUCTION
Social networks play an important role in information diffusion.
They give us motivation to use a small subset of influential indi-
viduals in a social network to activate a large number of people.
Kempe et al. [9] build a theoretical framework of influence max-
imization, aiming to find top-K influential nodes under certain
spreading models. They discuss two popular models - Independent
Cascade (IC) model and Linear Threshold (LT) model and propose
a greedy algorithm with (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation rate.
Easley and Kleinberg [7] divide the cause of information propa-
gation into two categories: information effects and direct-benefit
effects. Obviously, IC model and LT model belong to the former
one, while we focus on the latter one. In most spreading models,
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each node has two states: active and inactive. Equivalently say-
ing, it has two choices. In our Coordination Game (CG) model, we
regard information diffusion as the process of individual decision-
making. As individuals make their decisions based on the benefit
of coordination with their network neighbors, a particular pattern
of behavior can begin to spread across the links of the network.
Influence maximization under CG model is useful in viral mar-
keting. Let us recall the example in [9]. A company would like to
market a new product, hoping it will be adopted by a large fraction
of the network. The company can initially target a few influen-
tial nodes by giving them free samples of the product. Then other
nodes will probably switch to using the new product because of
the following two reasons: (1) They have higher evaluation of the
new product than the old one. (2) They have to coordinate with
their neighbors because using different products may reduce their
benefits. (e.g., people using different operating systems may have
compatibility problems when working together, and users from
different kinds of social media platforms cannot communicate with
each other timely.) Our model describes these two reasons precisely.
In this paper, we study how to find Top-K influential nodes under
CG model. We first propose our model which serves as the gener-
alization of some well-known spreading models, such as Majority
Vote model [2] and Linear Threshold model [9]. We then prove
some theoretical results under CG model, including NP-hardness
of the optimization problem itself and #P-hardness of computing
the objective function. Then we try to find a good approximation
algorithm for the problem. We embed our CG model into the sce-
nario of general diffusion process [12], and prove that the objective
function is monotone and submodular if and only if the cumulative
distribution function of people’s threshold is concave, in which case
the greedy algorithm can return a (1−1/e−ϵ) approximate solution.
As a traditional method, Kempe et al. [9] use 10,000 times of
Monte Carlo simulations to approximate the objective function, but
it costs too much time on large-scale networks. To accelerate our
algorithm, we use two efficient heuristics - LazyForward [10] and
StaticGreedy [6]. Experimental results show that our Greedy and
Greedy++ algorithms can activate more nodes than other heuristics.
Moreover, Greedy++ runs faster than Greedy by three orders of
magnitude.
Related Work. Kempe et al. [9] first build an algorithmic frame-
work of influence maximization by transforming it into a discrete
optimization problem. After their work, a lot of efforts have been
made on efficient computing methods of the objective function.
Some methods aim to reduce the number of trials that need Monte
Carlo simulations, such as CELF [10]. Other researchers focus on
how to calculate the influence spread efficiently. For instance, Chen
et al. [3, 4] use arborescences or DAGs to represent the original
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Figure 1: Payoff matrix of the coordination game.
graph. Cheng et al. propose a StaticGreedy strategy [6] and a
self-consistent ranking method [5].
Morris [11] is the first to propose a coordination game model
in contagion. This model is also discussed detailedly in Easley and
Kleinberg’s textbook [7]. We will extend this model by introducing
some random factors into utility values.
2 MODEL
In a social network G = (V ,E), we study a situation in which each
node has a choice between two behaviors, labeledA and B. If nodes
u and v are linked by an edge, then there is an incentive for them
to have their behaviors match. We use a game model to describe
this situation. There is a coordination game on each edge (u,v) ∈ E,
in which players u and v both have two strategies A and B. The
payoffs are defined as follows:
(1) ifu andv both adopt strategyA, they will get payoffs puA > 0
and pvA > 0 respectively;
(2) if they both adopt strategy B, they will get payoffs puB > 0
and pvB > 0 respectively;
(3) if they adopt different strategies, they each get a payoff of 0.
The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 1.
We define the total payoff of player u as the sum of the payoffs
it gets from all coordination games with its neighbors N (u) =
{v |(u,v) ∈ E}. If u can get a higher total payoff when it adopt A
than that when it adopt B, it will choose strategy A. Otherwise it
will choose strategy B.
According to the actual situation, we have the following assump-
tions for the payoffs:
(1) All the puA and puB (u ∈ V ) may not be equal to each other
because each person in the social network values behaviors A and
B differently.
(2) puA and puB (u ∈ V ) can either be constants or independent
and identically distributed random variables because the cascading
behaviors in networks are always considered to have determinate
principles with some stochastic factors.
Suppose u knows all the choices of its neighbors: there are xB
nodes adopting B and xA = deд(u) − xB nodes adopting A. Obvi-
ously, u will adopt B if and only if
puBxB ≥ puAxA = puA(deд(u) − xB ), (1)
or
xB ≥ puA
puA + puB
deд(u) = δudeд(u), δu ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
Influence Maximization Problem. Suppose now the market is
dominated byA (i.e., all of the nodes in the network chooseA). Given
a constant k , we want to find a seed set S0 ⊆ V , |S0 | ≤ k . Initially we
let each node in S0 adopt B (and they will never change their choices
again). Time then runs forward in unit steps. In each step, each node
decides whether to switch from strategy A to strategy B according
to the payoff-maximization principle. We can regard the evolution
of nodes’ choices as a spreading process of B in the network. The
spread of behavior B will finally stop in at most n = |V | steps.
We define Si = |{u ∈ V |u adopts B in step i}| (i = 1, 2, ...,n).
Our objective function is (the expectation of) the nodes affected by
B at last, or
σ (S0) = E{puA,puB |u ∈V }[|Sn |] = E{δu |u ∈V }[|Sn |]. (3)
Our purpose is to maximize σ (S0) subject to |S0 | ≤ k .
The CG model can be regarded as the generalization of the fol-
lowing two well-known spreading models.
Majority Vote Model. Suppose all the puA (u ∈ V ) are constants
and are equal to each other. So are all the puB (u ∈ V ). Equivalently,
let
pA = puA, pB = puB , δ = δu =
pA
pA + pB
, ∀u ∈ V . (4)
δ is a constant threshold same to every nodes. When pA = pB ,
or δ = 12 , the spreading model is called Majority Vote model, which
is extensively studied in [2].
Linear Threshold Model. If we set puA = 1 and let puB follow
a continuous power-law distribution, i.e., the probabilistic density
function of puB is
fB (x) = α(x + 1)γ , x ≥ 0, γ > 1, α =
1∫ ∞
0
1
(x+1)γ dx
= γ − 1, (5)
then ∀0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
Pr[δu ≤ x] = Pr[ 11 + puB ≤ x] = Pr[puB ≥ 1/x − 1]
=
∫ +∞
1/x−1
fB (t)dt = −(t + 1)−γ+1
+∞
1/x−1
= xγ−1.
(6)
If γ = 2, we will have δu ∼ U [0, 1]. This is the famous Linear
Threshold model where the weight on each edge adjacent to node
u is 1/deд(u) (i.e., bvu = 1deд(u) ,∀u,v ∈ V ).
Hardness. Under CGmodel, we have the following hardness result.
Theorem 2.1. (1) Influence maximization under CG model is NP-
hard. (2) Computing the objective function under CGmodel is #P-hard.
Proof. (1) Chen [2] proves the NP-hardness of Influence Maxi-
mization under Majority Vote model with δ = 12 , which is enough
to demonstrate the first result.
(2) Chen et al. [4] prove it is #P-hard to compute exact influence in
general networks under LT model. They use the settings that bvu =
const ,∀u,v ∈ V in their proof. We modify the proof and get the
hardness result under our settings.1 We reduce this problem from
the problem of counting simple paths in a directed graph. Given
a directed graph G = (V ,E), counting the total number of simple
paths in G is #P-hard [14]. Let n = |V | and D = maxv ∈V deдin (v).
From G, we construct n + 1 graphs G1,G2, ...,Gn+1. To get Gi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1), we first add D + i − deдin (v) “branching nodes"
linking to node v for all v ∈ V . And then we add a node s linking
1Note that bvu = const is not a special case of CG model.
to all nodes inV . Thus each node inGi has D + i + 1 in-links except
“branching nodes" and s .
According to our assumption, the weight on each edge in Gi is
wi =
1
D+i+1 . Let S0 = {s} and P denote the set of all simple paths
starting from s in Gi . (Note that P is identical in all Gi because
“branching nodes" are unreachable from s .) According to [4], we
have
σGi (S0) =
∑
π ∈P
∏
e ∈π
wi , (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1), (7)
where σGi (S0) means σ (S0) in Gi . Let Bj be the set of simple paths
of length j in P (0 ≤ j ≤ n). We have
σGi (S0) =
n∑
j=0
∑
π ∈Bj
∏
e ∈π
wi =
n∑
j=0
∑
π ∈Bj
w
j
i =
n∑
j=0
w
j
i |Bj |. (8)
We want to solve these n+1 linear equations with n+1 variables
|B0 |, |B1 |, ..., |Bn |. Since the coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde
matrix, (|B0 |, |B1 |, ..., |Bn |) is unique and easy to compute.
Finally, we notice that for each j = 1, 2, ...,n, there is a one-to-
one correspondence between paths in Bj and simple paths of length
j − 1 in G . Therefore, ∑nj=1 |Bj | is the total number of simple paths
in G. We complete our reduction. □
3 ALGORITHMS
Submodularity. To find a greedy algorithm with approximation
guarantee, the submodularity of the objective function is necessary.
We first recall the general diffusion process defined by Mossel and
Roch in [12].
Suppose each node v in the social network G = (V ,E) has a
threshold θv ∼ U [0, 1] i .i .d and a “local" spreading function fv :
2V → [0, 1]. Initially there is a seed set S0 ⊆ V . In each step t ≥ 1,
St = St−1 ∪ {v |v ∈ V − St−1 ∧ fv (St−1) ≥ θv }. (9)
The spreading process will stop in at most n = |V | steps. So the
objective function is σ (S0) = E{θu |u ∈V }[|Sn |].
We can embed our model into the scenario of the general diffu-
sion process.
Let Fδ be the cumulative distribution function of δu . Since δu ∈
[0, 1], we have Fδ (0) = 0 and Fδ (1) = 1. ∀v and S , let
θv = Fδ (δv ) and fv (S) = Fδ (
|S ∩ N (v)|
deд(v) ). (10)
Suppose Fδ is continuous and strictly monotone increasing in [0, 1],
then F−1δ exists, and ∀x ∈ [0, 1],
Pr[Fδ (δv ) ≤ x] = Pr[δv ≤ F−1δ (x)] = Fδ (F−1δ (x)) = x . (11)
So Fδ (δv ) ∼ U [0, 1]. Therefore
fv (S) ≥ θv ⇐⇒ Fδ (
|S ∩ N (v)|
deд(v) ) ≥ θv
⇐⇒ |S ∩ N (v)| ≥ F−1δ (θv )deд(v)
⇐⇒ |S ∩ N (v)| ≥ δvdeд(v).
(12)
Lemma 3.1. Suppose Fδ is continuous and strictly monotone in-
creasing in [0, 1], fv is monotone and submodular for any node v (in
any graph) iff Fδ is concave in [0, 1].
Proof. (⇐) If Fδ is concave in [0, 1], let дv (S) = |S∩N (v) |deд(v) ,
which is a modular function. It is easy to prove that the composi-
tion of a concave function and a modular function is submodular.
Therefore fv = Fδ ◦ дv is also monotone and submodular.
(⇒) If Fδ is not concave in [0, 1], then ∃a,b, λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
λFδ (a) + (1 − λ)Fδ (b) > Fδ (λa + (1 − λ)b). (13)
Since Fδ is (uniformly) continuous and bounded, if we pick up
three rational numbers N1M ,
N2
M and
p
q which are very close to a,b, λ
respectively, we will have
p
q
Fδ (
N1
M
) + q − p
q
Fδ (
N2
M
) > Fδ (
N1p + N2(q − p)
Mq
) = Fδ (
N3
Mq
).
(14)
Let Xi = ( iMq , Fδ ( iMq )) be the points on the curve of Fδ (i =
N1q, ...,N2q) and l0 be the line across XN1q and XN2q . We know
that XN3 is below l0. Therefore ∃K1 ≤ N3 − 1 and K2 ≥ N3 such
that
(1) XK1 is above or in l0 while XK1+1 is below l0.
(2) XK2 is below l0 while XK2+1 is above or in l0.
Let l1 be the line across XK1 and XK1+1 and let l2 be the line
across XK2 and XK2+1. We know that k(l1) < k(l0) < k(l2), where
k() is the slope of the line.
Assume there is a node v withMq neighbors. Let S be the set of
v’s K1 neighbors andT be the set ofv’s K2 neighbors, where S ⊂ T .
There is another neighbor u < T . Therefore
fv (T ∪ {u}) − fv (T ) = Fδ (
K2 + 1
Mq
) − Fδ (
K2
Mq
) = k(l2)
Mq
>
k(l1)
Mq
= Fδ (
K1 + 1
Mq
) − Fδ (
K1
Mq
) = fv (S ∪ {u}) − fv (S),
(15)
which violates the submodularity of fv . □
It is not difficult for us to understand Lemma 1 intuitively because
submodularity can be considered as a kind of concavity. Fδ being
concave in [0, 1] means that the distribution of people’s threshold
has a negative skewness, or they tend to have a higher evaluation
on new products than old ones. This assumption is reasonable in
some cases (e.g., the mobile phone market). Fδ being continuous
and strictly monotone increasing in [0, 1] is a technical assumption
instead of an essential one. We define these two assumptions as the
concave threshold property.
For the general diffusion process, Mossel and Roch [12] have
proved that σ (S0) is monotone and submodular if and only if fv
is monotone and submodular for any v ∈ V . Using this result and
Lemma 1, we can get Theorem 2 immediately.
Theorem 3.2. σ (S0) is monotone and submodular iff Fδ satisfies
the concave threshold property.
Theorem 2 provides a strong tool to judge the objective function’s
submodularity under certain spreading models. For example, under
Majority Vote model, σ (S0) is not submodular because Fδ (x) =
I(x ≥ δ ) is not concave in [0, 1], where I(·) is the indicator function.
In contrast, under Linear Threshold model, σ (S0) is submodular
because Fδ (x) = x is concave in [0, 1].
Up till now, we have proved the monotonicity and submodularity
of the objective function under CG model with some necessary
assumptions. Using the result in [9], the greedy algorithm given in
Algorithm 1 (Greedy) returns a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution.
Algorithm 1 Greedy(k , σ )
1: initialize S0 = ∅
2: for i = 1 to k do
3: select u = arдmaxv ∈V−S0 (σ (S0 ∪ {v}) − σ (S0))
4: S0 = S0 ∪ {u}
5: end for
6: output S0
Algorithm 2 Greedy++(k , σ , R′)
1: initialize S0 = ∅
2: for i = 1 to R′ do
3: generate the threshold δv (∀v ∈ V ) for snapshot Gi
4: end for
5: for all v ∈ V do
6: ∆v = +∞ //initialize the marginal gain of each node
7: end for
8: for i = 1 to k do
9: for all v ∈ V − S0 do
10: curv = f alse
11: end for
12: while true do
13: u = arдmaxv ∈V−S0∆v //maintain a priority queue
14: if curu then
15: S0 = S0 ∪ {u}
16: break
17: else
18: ∆u =
1
R′
∑R′
i=1(σGi (S0 ∪ {u}) − σGi (S0))
19: reinsert u into the priority queue and heapify
20: curu = true
21: end if
22: end while
23: end for
24: output S0
The algorithm simply selects seed nodes one by one, and each time
it always selects the node that provides the largest marginal gain
of the objective function.
Speeding-UpAlgorithm.Due to the hardness of computingσ (S0),
we use two efficient heuristics - LazyForward [10] and StaticGreedy
[6] to accelerate our algorithm.
Wemaintain a priority queue.When finding the next node, we go
through the nodes in decreasing order of their marginal gain. If the
marginal gain of the top node has not been updated, we recompute
it, and insert it into the priority queue again. The correctness of
this lazy procedure can be guaranteed due to the submodularity of
the objective function.
Instead of conducting a huge number of Monte Carlo simulations
each time, we generate a rather small number of snapshots Gi
(i = 1, 2, ...,R′) at the very beginning. In all the iterations, we run
the simulation on these snapshots and use the average number of
influenced nodes 1R′
∑R′
i=1 σGi (S0) to estimate the objective function
σ (S0).
We name the accelerated algorithm as Greedy++.
4 EXPERIMENTS
To test the effectiveness and efficiency of our Greedy and Greedy++
algorithms, we conduct experiments on three real-world networks
and compare our algorithms with other existing heuristics.
Datasets. The three real-world datasets include two collaboration
networks NetHEPT and NetPHY2, and one online social network
Epinions3. We summarize the statistical information of the these
datasets in Table 1.
Table 1: Statistical information of three datasets.
Datasets |V | |E | Type
NetHEPT 15,233 58,991 Undirected
NetPHY 37,154 231,584 Undirected
Epinions 75,879 508,837 Directed
Algorithms.A total of five algorithms are tested. Besides of Greedy
and Greedy++ proposed in this paper, we use other three heuristic
algorithms as benchmark methods.
(1) PageRank chooses nodes with the largest PageRank value.
Since influential nodes are considered to have a large number of
out-links, while nodes with high PageRank value are considered to
have lots of in-links, we first change the direction of all edges in
the graph and then run PageRank algorithm. We use α = 0.9 as the
random jump parameter. (2) Degree chooses nodes with the largest
out-degree. (3) Random chooses nodes at random.
There are a lot of other efficient algorithms to solve the influence
maximization problem under IC model or LT model, such as PMIA
[3], LDAG [4], IMRank [5], and IMM [13]. But they cannot be applied
in CG model directly, and we will not put them into the comparison.
Effectiveness.We first compare the effectiveness of Greedy and
Greedy++ with other algorithms by showing influence spread (i.e.,
|Sn |) of the obtained seed set.
In our CG model, distribution of δu can be various. We run
influence maximization algorithms under four different spreading
models in NetHEPT. In the four models, we set δu to be X , X 2,
√
X
and 0.5 respectively, where X ∼ U [0, 1]. Therefore the distribution
function Fδ (x) is x ,
√
x , x2 and I(x ≥ 0.5) corresponding to the four
cases.
Figure 2 shows our experimental results. In Figure 2, Greedy++
consistently matches the performance of Greedy and significantly
outperforms other heuristic algorithms in all cases. According to
Theorem 2, the first two cases are submodular cases, while the
other two are not. Therefore the approximation rates of Greedy
and Greedy++ are not guaranteed in the third and the fourth cases.
But our experimental results indicate that they still perform well
in these cases. Besides, all the curves of Greedy and Greedy++ are
concave no matter in submodular or nonsubmodular cases. In two
larger graphs NetPHY and Epinions, we get similar experimental
results, which are shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b).
Note that PageRank and Degree perform worse in nonlinear
threshold cases than they do in the linear case. The reason can be
explained as follows:
In the linear case, consider a random walk. It can start with any
node v in the graph. In each step, it randomly move toward an
2http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/people/weic/graphdata.zip
3http://snap.stanford.edu/data
(a) Linear Threshold (b) Concave Threshold (c) Convex Threshold (d) Majority Vote
Figure 2: Influence spread of various algorithms in NetHEPT, with different distribution of δu . (X ∼ U [0, 1].) (a) δu = X (submod-
ular). (b) δu = X 2 (submodular). (c) δu =
√
X (nonsubmodular). (d) δu = 0.5 (nonsubmodular).
(a) NetPHY (b) Epinions
Figure 3: Influence spread of various algorithms in (a) NetPHY
and (b) Epinions. (Fδ (x) = x .)
(a) NetPHY (b) Epinions
Figure 4: Jaccard similarity of the seed set with Greedy in (a)
NetPHY and (b) Epinions. (Fδ (x) = x .)
(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) Running time of various algorithms on three
datasets. (Fδ (x) = x .) (b) Running time of various algorithms
in NetHEPT, with different distribution of δu . (X ∼ U [0, 1].)
“in-degree" neighbor (which means the movement is reverse to the
direction of the edge). The random walk will not stop until one
node has been visited twice. Note that this kind of random walk
is very similar to the one in PageRank except the stop condition.
Borgs et al. [1] define the set of the nodes which are visited during
the random walk as the RR (Reverse Reachable) Set for v , and they
prove that in the linear threshold case, the set cover problem of RR
sets is equivalent to the influence maximization problem. Therefore
the probability for a node to be included in the RR sets reflects its
influence power. This fact explains why PageRank (or the “inverse
random walk") is useful.
But in nonlinear cases like the Figure 2(b), since most nodes in
the network have a low threshold, the first person we select can
affect a wide range of nodes. But when we want to choose other
influential nodes, PageRank and Degree tend to select “central"
nodes with high degree. But most of the “central" nodes can easily
be affected from the first node. (Because in an undirected graph,
nodes with larger “out-degree" also have larger “in-degree", or more
chances to be affected.) So they are no longer useful in the spreading
process after the most influential node being selected.
We also compute the Jaccard similarity between the seed set se-
lected by Greedy and that by other algorithms. The result is shown
in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), from which we can see that Greedy++ con-
sistently shares much higher similarity with Greedy than PageRank
and Degree do, meaning the introduction of LazyForward and Stat-
icGreedy strategies will not cause significant loss of effectiveness.
Efficiency. We now test the running time of these algorithms.
Figure 3 shows our experimental results.
As we expected, Greedy++ runs consistently faster than Greedy,
with more than three orders of magnitude speedup. For example,
in the linear threshold case, it takes Greedy more than 9 days to
get the top-20 influential nodes in Epinions while Greedy++ only
requires 8 minutes.
In the concave threshold case, Greedy++ spends more time be-
cause δu is small and the influence spread tends to be wide. But it is
worthwhile because the strategies only finding “central nodes" no
longer work in this case (see Figure 2(b)). In Majority Vote model,
the efficiency of the greedy algorithm dramatically rises because
the estimation of influence spread becomes easy.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed how to find top-K influential nodes
in social networks under a game theoretic model. We show the hard-
ness of the optimization problem itself, as well as the hardness of
calculating the objective function. We prove the approximation
guarantee of the greedy algorithm under necessary assumptions.
We also accelerate our algorithm with the combination of Lazy-
Forward and StaticGreedy. Our experimental results demonstrate
that Greedy++ matches Greedy in the spreading effect while signif-
icantly reducing running time, and it outperforms other heuristic
algorithms such as MaxDegree and PageRank.
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A EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
As a digression, we discuss our model from the perspective of game
theory. An important problem is to find the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (PSNE) of the game [8]. In a PSNE, the strategy each
node adopts is the best strategy toward its neighbors. Obviously,
when all nodes adopt strategy A (or strategy B), the whole network
will achieve a PSNE. A more meaningful problem is that given the
initial state of each node, whether the network will converge to a
PSNE or not. We take an early step in this problem by studying the
case of the Majority Vote model.
As we mentioned, the spread of a new behavior will finally stop
in at most |V | steps under CG model. However, the final state may
not be a PSNE because nodes in the initial seed set may not have
chosen the best strategy. To discuss the PSNE, we need to allow
initial seed nodes to change their choices. Therefore, the model
can be explained as follows: Initially some nodes in the network
choose strategy A, while others choose B. In each step, each node
decides whether to change its strategy according to the payoff-
maximization principle. Under this model, nodes can switch their
decision for many times. Once all nodes stop changing their states,
our game achieves a PSNE. To simplify the model, we assume that
no one will meet a dilemma in the game (i.e., pBxB , pAxA at any
time4).
4e.g., pA = pB = 1 and each node has an odd number of neighbors.
However, this PSNE will not always appear. Let us consider a
complete graph with 4 nodes. Initially, two nodes choose A and the
other two choose B. It is easy to see that all of the four nodes will
“swing" between A and B forever. In this case, the repeated game
will become a “2-periodic" process, thus will never converge to a
PSNE. Actually, we have the following conclusion.
Lemma A.1. ∀pA, pB ∈ Z+, the game will either converge to a
PSNE or become a “2-periodic" process in O(max{pA,pB }|E |) steps.
Proof. W.l.o.g., we assume that pA ≥ pB . In step k , let fk (v) =
pA if node v adopts strategy A, and fk (v) = −pB if v adopts B. We
define the potential function as
Fk =
∑
(u,v)∈E
(fk (u)fk−1(v) + fk−1(u)fk (v))
=
∑
u
∑
v ∈N (u)
fk (u)fk−1(v) =
∑
u
∑
v ∈N (u)
fk (v)fk−1(u).
(16)
Therefore,
Fk+1 − Fk =
∑
u
∑
v ∈N (u)
fk+1(u)fk (v) −
∑
u
∑
v ∈N (u)
fk (v)fk−1(u)
=
∑
u
(fk+1(u) − fk−1(u))(
∑
v ∈N (u)
fk (v)).
(17)
Since pBxB , pAxA at any time, we have
∑
v ∈N (u) fk (v) , 0.
If
∑
v ∈N (u) fk (v) > 0, u should choose A in the next step and
therefore fk+1(u) = pA ≥ fk−1(u). If
∑
v ∈N (u) fk (v) < 0, u should
choose B in the next step and therefore fk+1(u) = −pB ≤ fk−1(u).
In both cases, fk+1(u) − fk−1(u) and
∑
v ∈N (u) fk (v) have the same
sign. Therefore, Fk+1 − Fk ≥ 0.
It is also easy to prove that:
(1) Fk ≤ 2p2A |E |, Fk ≥ −2pApB |E |.
(2) If Fk+1 − Fk , 0, then Fk+1 − Fk ≥ (pA + pB ) × 1.
So ∃K ≤ 2p2A |E |−(−2pApB |E |)pA+pB = O(pA |E |) such that FK+1 − FK =
0, or ∑
u
(fK+1(u) − fK−1(u))(
∑
v ∈N (u)
fK (v)) = 0. (18)
Since
∑
v ∈N (u) fK (v) , 0, we have fK+1(u) − fK−1(u) = 0 (∀u ∈
V ). In other words, in step K +1, all nodes choose the same strategy
as they do in step K − 1. Therefore, in step K + 2, they will choose
the same strategy as they do in step K , and so on. The process then
has a period of 1 or 2, corresponding to a PSNE or a “2-periodic"
process, respectively. □
With the help of Lemma A.1, we can have an efficient algorithm
to compute PSNE. We directly simulate the evolution of each node’s
state. Once we find that the process becomes “2-periodic" (it only
takes 2 more steps), we know that the network cannot achieve a
PSNE. Otherwise, we can get the PSNE inO(max{pA,pB }|E |) steps.
The time complexity of the algorithm is O(max{pA,pB }|E |(|V | +
|E |)). We conclude the result in Theorem A.2.
TheoremA.2. SupposepA,pB ∈ Z+ and are fixed, given the initial
state of each node, it is polynomial-time to answer the following
questions: (1) Will the network converge to a PSNE? (2) If so, compute
the PSNE.
